

REASONS

FOUNDED ON

FACTS

FOR A

LATE MOTION.

In a LETTER to a MEMBER, &c.



L O N D O N :

Printed for T. COOPER, at the *Globe* in
Pater-Noster-Row, 1741.

R. E. A. S. O. N. S.

FOUNDED ON

F. A. C. T. S.

FOR A

L. A. T. E. M. O. T. I. O. N.

46

1 57 9

Two better members, &c.



L. O. N. D. O. N.

Printed for T. Cadogan, at the ...
Printed for T. Cadogan, at the ...



A
L E T T E R

T O A
T O R Y M E M B E R.

S I R,



A S T time I had the Pleasure of your Company you may remember the Discourse turn'd upon that kind of Evidence which was most proper to induce either House of Parliament to pass a Censure upon a Minister. The Case of my Lord *Strafford* was mention'd, wherein tho' nine General and twenty-eight Special Articles were produc'd against him, not one of them was

B

prov'd

prov'd so as to fix upon him even a Censure for a Misdemeanour. Yet the Parliament thought the Proof amounted *accumulatively* to a sufficient Ground whereon to build an Attainder.

As the Charge against this Minister, as laid down in the nine General Articles will I believe be the same in the main with that which shall be brought against every wicked Minister; I shall lay them before you, and then, by comparing them with what pass'd in that Celebrated Tryal, leave you to lay it Home to yourself whether, if a Parliament was justify'd in inflicting the highest Penalty without one of these Articles being so much as pretended to be prov'd, any Gentleman can be justify'd in refusing to concur in inflicting a milder Censure in a Case where the like, but a stronger, Charge was known to be true to every Man within Doors.

1st. That he had traiterously endeavour'd to destroy the Constitution, and introduce an Arbitrary Government.

2dly. That he had assum'd Regal Power to the undoing of many.

3dly. That he had converted great Part of his Majesty's Treasure and Revenues to his own Use.

4thly.

4thly. That he had abus'd his Authority by encouraging Papists.

5thly. That he had endeavour'd to create a War between *England* and *Holland*.

6thly. That being Lieutenant General of his Majesty's Armies, he had betray'd his Majesty's Subjects to Death, and his Army to a Shameful Defeat at *Newburn* by the *Scots*; and suffer'd *Newcastle* to fall into their Hands, to the end that *England* might be engaged in an irreconcilable Quarrel with the *Scots*.

7thly. That he endeavour'd to incense his Majesty against Parliaments, thereby to create Divisions between him and his People, and destroy these Kingdoms, for which they impeach'd him of high Treason.

8thly. That he committed these Acts while he was Lord Deputy of *Ireland*, Lieutenant General of the Armies of *England* and *Ireland*, Lord President and Lieutenant General of the North.

9thly. The Commons, saving to themselves the Liberty of exhibiting any other Accusation, pray'd that the Earl might be brought to Justice, &c.

Give me leave now, Sir, to suppose that

B 2

these

these Articles had been aggravated in the following Manner, *viz.*

That he had not only *Traiterously endeavour'd to destroy the Constitution*, but had Impiously and Sacrilegiously found out the means to make the Constitution destroy itself; by keeping up its Forms but abolishing its Essentials; by sticking to the *dead Letter*, but destroying the *living Spirit*. That this he had effected by disposing of a Royal and a National Revenue greater than ever was known, in filling one of the Houses of Parliament, whose Members are his immediate Judges, with Creatures immediately depending on himself, and who, should they proceed to check him, must themselves be undone.

That by these means he had created to himself an Impunity of Guilt. That this Impunity had produc'd an Insolence of Power unknown to any former Minister, and inconsistent with that Equality that ought to prevail among the Subjects of a free Nation.

That besides his Endeavours to *introduce an Arbitrary Government*, which was prevented only by the Justice and Equanimity of his Royal Master, he actually had

had succeeded in his Endeavours to introduce a Military one, behind which, should he be condemn'd by the Laws of his Country, he might screen himself with Defiance.

That if by *Regal Power* was understood the Power of Rewarding and Punishing, and the actual Exercise of a King of *Britain's* Prerogative, the same great Minister had abus'd it more than it could have been in the Power of a King himself, had he so inclin'd to have done; because every Subject is answerable to his Country if, by Orders of the King himself, he shall act against her Laws; but no Man of bad Principles scruples to act under the Direction of a Minister who takes all upon himself, and who has in his own Hands the means of acting with Impunity.

That besides his undoing of many by the Exercise of this Regal Power which he had assum'd, he had actually undone the Nation in her Trade, in her Manufactures, in her Reputation, and in her Interest abroad. That this he had done by meanly putting up with the most infamous Usage, and when he could not continue Peace even at the Expence of submitting to such Usage, that he had
been

been driven into a War which was carried on in a scandalous pusillanimous Manner.

That he not only converted great Part of his Majesty's Treasure to his own Use, but that not a Shilling of it was expended, or could be expended, but by his Direction, and in what manner he was pleased to appoint.

That such an Abuse was of more fatal Consequence in him than in any other Minister, because no Minister ever had so great Revenues to dispose of. That these Revenues had created an Influence unknown to the Constitution; which none of our Ancestors ever could suppose, and which therefore could not be provided against by any positive Act.

That as an Aggravation to this last Charge, the Revenues which he thus abused, were the free Gift of a grateful People, who by giving Dignity and Strength to Sovereign Power expected themselves to continue free and independent.

That the other Extension of his Power, which lay in bestowing Posts and Employments, was occasioned by the vast Burden of Debt, to which the Nation

was

was subjected by a long and tedious War, for the Preservation of her Liberty. That if the Consequence of her Zeal to maintain the Balance of *Europe*, and to avert Slavery from herself and other Powers, was to be a Subjection to the worst of Slavery, it had been much more eligible for her tamely to have submitted to a Foreign Power, who is able to protect her, rather than to the worst of her own Sons, whose Corruption must at last betray her into the same or a worse Submission.

That if *he did not abuse his Authority by openly encouraging Papists*, yet he did more Service to their Cause than any Minister before ever did, by endeavouring to render a Protestant Government more odious to the People than the worst of Popish ones.

That if his Conduct was not attended with that Effect, it could be attributed only to the Personal Virtues of his Majesty and the Zeal of the Nation for his Royal House.

That it was notoriously known that almost through all the Counties of *Great Britain* the Ministerial Interest was supported and abetted by the avow'd Papists and disaffected, a strong Presumption
of

of their believing that the Success of the Minister was the readiest means of paving the way for Success to themselves and their own Cause.

That he had indeed always industriously endeavoured to avoid a War, but that this was the Effect of partial Views and Pusillanimity, not of Prudence and carefully providing for the Interests of a Trading Nation. That this political Forbearance had been attended with more fatal Consequences to the Interests of *Great Britain* than the most unsuccessful War could have been ; since it had given Occasion for her old and hereditary Enemy to rise on the Ruins of her firmest and most natural Ally.

That after he was forced into a War by his Majesty's own Firmness, and the repeated Applications of Parliament, he had done all that lay in his Power to render that War unsuccessful and inglorious.

That tho' there were no Proofs of his Endeavours to incense his Majesty against Parliaments, yet that there were many Proofs of his endeavouring to render Parliaments useless and burdensome to the Nation.

That it was more than to be suspected
he

he had been but too successful in creating Differences of a more private Nature, which it was greatly to be feared might perpetuate a Division and Animosity of the most fatal Consequence.

That he had committed all this at a Time when he did not only not disown, but in the Face of the Parliament openly avowed himself to be the first Minister, and accountable for the Event and Conduct of all his Majesty's Measures.

I shall make no Application of these Articles to a great Man now alive; but as you have been pleased lately to express your Dislike to the manner in which my Lord *Strafford* was proceeded against, and likewise, contrary to all the former Tenor of your public Conduct, to give your Voice for an Acquittal upon a much stronger Charge, tho' for a far less severe Penalty, I shall beg Leave to put to you a few Queries.

In the first Place, Sir, can you or any Man alive think that any Prisoner at the *Old Bailey* could be condemn'd if all the Evidence, upon which he is to be try'd, is in his own Pocket?

Secondly, Can you imagine such a Criminal would not mock the Prosecutors,

C

if

if he knew the Jury were sensible that if they bring in their Verdict for his being obliged to produce these Evidences, they themselves must be Sufferers, and perhaps the same or a more severe Penalty might be inflicted upon them that was design'd against the Criminal.

But to bring these two Cases to the Point. I foresee that you will object, as I have formerly heard you do, that there is, if this is the Case, an end of all Justice from a certain Quarter, and that if these Suppositions upon the Application hold true, they prove too much, since they prove that it is ridiculous to make any Motion for either an Enquiry or any thing that can be of Use to the Nation. But Sir, I believe, there was not a Man in either H—e who was of Opinion the Morning before a certain Motion was made that it would be carried in the Affirmative. No, Sir, all that the Gentlemen who were Friends to the Motion did or could mean was to bring in a Motion for a gentle Censure upon a plain Proposition which was notorious and known to every Man in the Kingdom. Had this Motion been rejected by no greater a Majority than that which has carried some of the
most

most important Questions of late Years, such as the E——e Scheme and the C———n, the World might then have hop'd that the Eyes of the Public must have been soon open'd, that they must have seen there was no farther Use of any Application in a certain way, and it no doubt wou'd have had the very best Influence upon the next Elections, by encouraging the Electors, as the Majority was so very small, to bestir themselves in shaking off the Weight of M——l Influence. But what, Sir, is the Consequence as the Question has gone? It tends to convince the Public of what you, I am sure, and every understanding Man of your Party is convinc'd is false; I mean, that the Contempt this Nation has fallen into abroad, and her Poverty at Home, has not been owing to the sole Ministry and Management of one Person. There is not, there cannot be any Difference betwixt the Court and Country Party of which you have long and do now own yourself to be one, but two Questions, *viz.* Whether, in the Affairs of Government, a certain Right H——— G———n is not a Prime Minister, to all Intents and Purposes, as in the most arbitrary Countries. 2dly, If he

he is, whether the Affairs of this Nation, since he enter'd into the sole Management, have not gone from bad to worse both at Home and Abroad. These, I say Sir, are the two principal Points in difference betwixt the two Denominations of Court and Country Parties; now let us examine a little on what Side Reason lies; and this Examination will determine how far justifiable it was for certain Gentlemen, upon a late Occasion, by their Behaviour, to give the World Reason to suspect that neither of these Propositions were agreeable to the Tory Principles, and consequently that they were Enemies, not to the Power but to the Person of the Minister; or to speak more plainly, that in their Principles they were against any Minister, however wicked, being called to an Account, because it might one Day prove an ugly Precedent for some of themselves. A Notion of this kind could not fail of having the worst Effects at the approaching Elections. The uncorrupted Part of the Electors will have Reason to despair, and others to exult. The honest Part of the Nation, I say, will have but a melancholy Prospect before their Eyes, when it shall appear, that even tho' a
Change

Change were brought about in the M—
—y it can be attended with no Advan-
tages either to themselves or the Nation.
That the same Power must continue, the
same m——l Influence be propagated,
and that, tho' there may be a temporary
Alteration of Measures upon the Change
of the M—y, yet that still the same un-
controlable Power of acting wickedly, that
is lodg'd in the present, must devolve upon
every future M—. But to return to
our present Point.

It was very much insisted upon, on
a late Occasion, that Facts should be
produced to prove this Minister really as
wicked as he was called. You know very
well, Sir, what a dangerous Thing it is to
advance a Fact against a M—r in an
Assembly, which, for these two and
twenty Years past, never found any Fact
that was advanced against him to be
FACT. To prove this, Sir, I need but
appeal to yourself. Have you not often,
upon its appearing to you that this R—t
H—— G——n was concern'd
in secreting little Rogues, in diverting En-
quiries, in pushing on arbitrary Laws, in
negotiating dishonourable Treaties, in
making up false Accounts, in spreading
uni-

universal Corruption ; I say, Sir, have not you yourself, upon its appearing that one or all of these were the Case, voted against him ? Then why, in the Name of Goodness, should not that Evidence, which was sufficient to direct your Conscience when the Case was partial, have no Weight with you when the Charge was general. The Consideration of this, Sir, naturally leads me into the two Points which I proposed to examine, viz. *Whether a certain R——t H——— Gentleman is not, and has not, for twenty Years past, been a Prime M——r to all Intents and Purposes as in the most arbitrary Countries ?* This is a Question that may easily be discussed, since I never in my Life heard it deny'd. I may venture, Sir, to put it to yourself, if you have not heard the same Gentleman take upon him to answer for all the Measures of the M——y ; if you have not heard him generously disclaim all Subterfuges, to which former Ministers had Recourse, by screening himself behind the Authority of his Royal Master ? Is it not notoriously known that every Post, Civil, Military, or Ecclesiastical, is disposed of through him alone ; and that without him nothing is disposed of ?

of? This is a Proposition that perhaps admits of a stronger Proof than anything that can be advanced, because I do not believe there is one Man in the three Kingdoms disputes it. If so, I believe the Truth is, that this Gentleman comes precisely within the Description of a Prime Minister; nay, such a Minister as is to be met with in the most arbitrary Country. I hope you will not mistake me, as if I meant that this Power is uncontrollable, as it is in arbitrary Countries, when the Prince is on the Side of the Minister. No; what I mean is, that tho' he is vested with as great Power, yet that he is accountable to his Prince and the Parliament for the Exercise of that Power is certain. But is that any Satisfaction to the Nation for his abusing it, if by such an Abuse her Interests are irretrievably ruin'd? But if he is accountable, sure there ought to be a Time when such Account is to be made. And can any Time be more proper than when the Measure of his Crimes are full? But that is not the Case; I am not, say you, at all satisfy'd, by any Proof that has been brought, that he is guilty.

This is best answer'd by examining
the

the Truth of the second Question I laid down, *viz.* If he is a *prime M——r*, whether the Affairs of this Nation, since he enter'd into their sole Management, have not gone from bad to worse, both Abroad and at Home. As the Discussion of this Question turns upon Facts I shall take the Liberty to keep in my Eye the Charge advanced by the House of Commons against the Earl of *Strafford*; and we shall then see whether that Charge, as aggravated in the manner I have laid it down, will be applicable in the present Case.

In all Reasoning, even *mathematical*, there are certain Principles or Postulata granted, upon which the Proof of every Proposition is founded. In political or moral Reasoning, these *Postulata* are in greater Number, and admit of greater Latitude. The only Concession which I shall demand on this Occasion, is a Concession which you have often own'd, and which, as I said before, no Man in the three Nations doubts of, *viz.* That a certain R——t H——— G——n is a first Minister. This being granted, it follows, that he is accountable for the Executive Part of Power, and the Disposal

posal of the public Revenues. Now, as it is certain that one of the principal Ends which the Revolution was to answer, was to procure an independent House of Parliament, so whatever tends to destroy that Intention, is a traiterous Subversion of the Constitution. The keeping a House of Parliament free from Members, depending upon the Crown, was justly esteem'd the readiest Way to preserve the Independency of the whole. This is a Measure which may be read in the Face of every one Act, tending either to promote or to secure the Principles of the Revolution. Now, Sir, if this Maxim has not only been broke through, but render'd absolutely ineffectual, it must have been by means of a Prime Minister. If it shall be said that these Alterations were made by Parliament, it lies upon the Minister to prove that this Parliament was under no other Influence than that, under which the Parliament thro' which the Bill of Rights passed, was. If it shall, on the other hand, be proved, that every Act, by which any Innovation in any of the great Charters of our Liberty was made, passed, while a certain Assembly were under the immediate Influence of

D

the

the Minister, by its Majority possessing Posts and Pensions at his Pleasure, it then follows, that tho' the Acts of this Assembly were indeed valid, yet that the Conduct of the Minister was censurable. I say, the Acts of such an Assembly are valid, and therefore the passing a Censure upon any Member of that Assembly in his *Ministerial* Capacity, can never be deem'd a Censure upon the Assembly itself. They cannot be censur'd, because they made no bad Use of their Power; which was Legislative; but the Minister may for making a bad use of his, which was Executive,

That he made a bad Use of it appears from its being dispos'd and distributed amongst those, who, had they been as corrupted as himself, might have betray'd the Liberties of the Nation; and that he dispos'd of it thus is evident on the Face of the Lists of every Parliament, which have sat, since his entering on the Ministry to this Day. The Censure of a Minister therefore, in this Capacity, can never reflect any Censure upon the Parliament, on the contrary it rather communicates to it Dignity and Lustre, since it is a Proof that the Majority of it at least is sensible
that

that what they possess ought to be independent of the Crown, nay of the Minister himself.

The next Aggravation of the Charge against a Minister, which I mention'd, was his creating to himself an Impunity of Guilt; and this Impunity producing an Insolence of Power unknown to any former Minister, and inconsistent with that Equality of Power that ought to prevail among the Subjects of a free Nation.

The only means by which a Minister of *Great Britain* can create to himself an Impunity of Guilt, is by having a determin'd Majority in a certain Assembly ready to vote as he pleases. If you are of Opinion that this is by no means the Case with a certain G——n, you are intirely in the right in giving your Vote for his Acquittal, since to nothing that has been transacted by him in the whole course of his Ad——n has the Approbation of that Assembly been refus'd. But if this is the very Complaint, this the very Grievance, it is surely worthy the Cares of a *British* Parliament after so long and uninterrupted Approbation of these Measures; and repeated Disappointments arising from them; at least to enquire whether they have

have not been impos'd upon by certain fair and plausible Arguments; certain bold and confident Assertions; certain assurances of Friends where we had none; certain fears of an Enemy where no Enemy was, at least none who cou'd hurt us. I say, repeated bad Success from so often approv'd of Measures was a good Reason for believing that there must be some Defect either in the Honesty or Abilities of the great Conductor of all these Measures that render'd him very *unfit any longer to be in his Majesty's Councils*. In every one instance of Approbation given to these Measures, you, Sir, was of the Minority; and was satisfy'd of the Evidence and Reasons that render'd them unfit to be approv'd of; yet when the Day comes when the Sum total is to be accounted for, you disagree to that, tho' you have already own'd and still own the Justice of every particular Article of the Bill. I shou'd be glad to know if this is not establishing a perpetual Impunity of Guilt in every future Minister.

Insolence of Power is the natural consequence of Impunity of Guilt. If this M——r never made any wanton use of his Power in taking Places of Trust and Profit

Profit from those who possess'd them, because they differ'd from him; if he never depriv'd any Officer of his Commission in the Army for the Part he acted in the Senate; if he never supply'd the Places of old experienc'd Officers with those who never either had Experience or Authority; if he never publicly in a full House laid it down as a Maxim that he wou'd not suffer any Man to contradict the K—g's, that is, the Minister's Measures, to continue in the Army or any Post from which he cou'd be remov'd; in short, if he has not displac'd from both Civil and Military Employments those who were known to be the best Friends of this Establishment, those who did and suffer'd the most for supporting it; I say, if he has not done all this, then no Influence of Power can be laid to his Charge.

But these, you will say, are but partial Instances, and the Cases of private Persons never ought to come into a general Charge, at least ought never to determine it. But did you never know of any Attempt made by the same G——n to render one of the H—— of P——t insignificant; by advising an application from the Throne to the other *alone*, upon a Point that

that ought immediately to have been communicated to both. In what sense can such a Conduct be construed but as an Attempt to reduce a *B——b* P——t to a *French* one, and render it no more than a Court of Revenue. Was there never any Instance of his refusing to pay any regard to the Addresses of P——t, nor of his advising improper Answers to those Addresses that he dislik'd? If you are sensible now that nothing of all this which I have mention'd ever was the Case you was in the right to give your Voice in his Favour.

The next Aggravation of my Lord *Strafford's* Charge which I have taken the Liberty to suppose is;

That besides his Endeavours to introduce an arbitrary Government, which was prevented only by the Justice and Equanimity of his Royal Master, he had actually succeeded in his Endeavours to introduce a *Military one*, behind which shou'd he be condemn'd by the Laws of his Country he might screen himself with Defiance.

I believe there is no proposition more plain than that a Minister of *B——n*, who shall have a P——t to approve of all

all his Measures, and an Army to put them in Execution, may if he pleases be as Arbitrary and as Tyranical as any Minister in the World. If you are of Opinion, that such an Approbation has not been, nor cannot be, had; if you are of Opinion that such an Army cannot be rais'd; then our M——r has it not in his Power to render either his Master or himself Arbitrary. But, if you are convinc'd that no Measure which this M——r can go into, can be too bad not to gain Approbation; if you are convinc'd that there is sufficient Power in the M——r by means of the Army to enforce the Execution of that Measure, then must you own that the Prince if he pleases may render himself Arbitrary and Despotick, and consequently that such a M——r is dangerous to the Constitution, since nothing but the personal Virtues of the Prince can prevent the Nation from becoming Slaves.

No Advocate for Power in the Minister ever yet deny'd a military Force in *Great Britain* during Peace to be inconsistent with the Constitution. That ever since an Honourable G——n came into Power we have had a military Force, and a large one too, always on Foot, is plain
from

from Facts. Now, Sir, if you are of Opinion, as you have always declar'd you are not, that there was an evident necessity for continuing this military Force, from Year to Year; if you think that they are so few as not to be dangerous to our Liberties; if you think that Commissions in the Army are not render'd Baits for obtaining Votes in the Senate; if you are convinc'd that it was not thro' the sole Influence and Advice of a certain R——t H——le Gentleman that all this was done; then are you in the right to give your Vote for the M——r. But if on the other Hand you are of Opinion that all the wise and honest Purposes of Government might have been answer'd with a third Part of the Forces that have been for these twenty Years kept on Foot; if you are of Opinion that the Army so greatly expensive to this Kingdom, and which was also granted by Parliament for the Defence of it, had been managed both as to Rewards and Punishments in such manner as to make it of no military use, but on the contrary to render it subservient to the very worst of Purposes, the influencing Elections without Doors, and Votes within.

And

And now, Sir, that I have mention'd the Army, give me Leave to suggest some Reasons to you, which shall all be built upon positive undeniable Facts why every Gentleman, who pretends to be a Friend to his Country, ought to have been determined in favour of the M——r, from a Consideration of the Management of the Army.

That a considerable Augmentation has been resolved and is actually raising is certain. But they without Doors cannot apprehend how such an Augmentation becomes necessary at this Juncture; and they within Doors, as you well know, have never yet received any Lights which may convince them of the Necessity or even Expediency of such Augmentation. The Number of Land Forces which this Nation has in Pay, exclusive of the Augmentation which is voted, amount to 51515 Effective Men. The greatest Number of National Troops which we maintain'd in the late great and glorious War, under the Duke of *Marlborough*, was 67000, including the Non-effectives, which, had they been reduced to the Footing of our present Establishment, could not be fewer than 10000. There-
E
fore

fore of Effective Men in the last War it cannot be said we had ever above 57000. So that the Difference betwixt the Troops which we had on Foot last Year, (when there was not a Sword drawn, nor the Apprehension or Appearance of their being brought into the Field,) and the Years in which the Battles *Blenheim*, *Ramillies*, &c. were fought, is not quite 5500. This Session you have had Estimates laid before you, and you have already voted for an Augmentation of 10325 Men. Thus the Number of our National Forces for the ensuing Year stands as follows,

Forces raised	<u>51515.</u>
To be raised	<u>10325.</u>
<i>Total</i>	61830.

The greatest Number of National Forces in the last War was 57000

Difference is 4830 more Men than we had in any Year of the last War.

To these, if we consider that at least twelve thousand Men, I cannot be positive how many more, are kept in Pay in *Ireland*,

land, we shall find that his Majesty, as King of *Britain*, can now bring to the Field about seventy-four thousand Men. Now, Sir, after this plain Fact is laid down, I should be glad to know in what manner you, or any of that R——t H—— G——n's Friends, can answer to the following plain Questions :

Is there a Necessity for so formidable a Body of Forces being kept on Foot, or is there not ? If there is, from what did that Necessity spring ? Surely not from the Situation of our Foreign Affairs ; for the only two Powers we have to dread are *France* and *Spain* : But what have we to dread from them ? Their Naval Force ? Ours is double, both for Number and Largeness of Ships, and the Experience and Goodness of Seamen : Are we to dread their Land Forces ? I know you yourself, Sir, have often affirm'd, and you know it to be true, that the greatest Number of Men which either *France* or *Spain* can Land on our Coast, without their being perceiv'd by our Ships, which 'tis next to a miracle they should not be, is ten or twelve thousand at most. These our very Militia would be able to defeat

in a Country, where they could have no Shelter, no Support, no Friends.

Upon the whole, I think it is evident next to a Demonstration, that while we are Masters at Sea, we can be under no real apprehensions of any Invasion from Abroad. But as I know that this is the stale Cant of the Faction, and the strongest Pretence for keeping up so exorbitant a Body of Land Forces, give me leave to consider this Affair a little farther. It is very well known that during the last War with *France* that Power was generally in a Condition to spare twenty or thirty thousand Men for any Expedition, and still to keep her main Armies on Foot. It is no less certain that there was then a strong Party in the Nation which was disaffected to the Government. Yet we find that in the most glorious Year of the last War, while the Duke of *Marlborough* and his Army were in the heart of *Germany* and far from being in a Capacity of giving us any Assistance had we been invaded, the wise Administration of these Days thought that nine thousand Men were sufficient for the Protection of the Nation; and we find that in the Year 1708, when *France* had attempted
the

the most formidable Invasion that it is in her Power to make without being perceived by our Fleets, it was defeated without any of our Land Forces being of any Service.

Whatever may be pretended by the Friends of the Administration with regard to the necessity of keeping up so great a number of Forces at this juncture, on account of any demands of our Allies, will appear weak and ridiculous, if we consider first that no such demand has been yet intimated to the Parliament from the Crown ; and as for us, we have reason to believe, from the Nature of Things, none has been made to his Majesty by any of his Allies. But supposing that any such demand were made, the Forces in the Continent now in the Pay of *Great Britain*, would be more than sufficient to answer any such demand, without putting this Nation to any Expences of maintaining an immense number of Troops within herself which may be dangerous to her Liberties. Should the necessity of Foreign Affairs call upon us for more, it will not only be cheaper and safer, but more advantageous for those Powers themselves, that we furnish our

Quotas

Quotas in Money; we being able to maintain with the same Sum upwards of a fourth more of Foreign Troops, than we can of our own Natives. Thus the furnishing our Quotas in Money, must be an advantage to our Allies. And tho' perhaps it might not so well answer the Purposes of the M——r, yet it must much better answer the Purposes of the Nation.

The next thing, Sir, which I think myself oblig'd to take Notice on this Head, is the manner in which the past and intended Augmentations have been, or ought to be, made. The practice of those Countries where military Government prevails ought to be a Rule and Direction to us in all military Affairs relating to this Nation. Among the *German* Princes, the Knowledge of military Affairs is almost their sole Study, and there, it is well known, that an Augmentation seldom or never takes Place by raising new Regiments, which may create an additional Expence in Officers, but by adding additional Companies to the Regiments already rais'd, or by encreasing their Companies with an additional number of Men, and adding a Serjeant and a Corporal in each

each Company. This is the Method in which his Majesties own Forces are Augmented in his Electoral Dominions, and it is certainly a more frugal as well as a more useful Method than any other. In *France* indeed the Augmentation is commonly by Regiments; but for that there is a double Reason. 1st. When an augmentation of the *French* Troops are to take Place, the Government gives a Commission to any Man who has Vanity and Money enough to undertake it, to raise a Regiment; which he does out of his own Pocket, without putting the Public to a Shilling of Expence. In the next Place, *France* has a numerous poor Nobility and Gentry who all betake themselves to the Army, and most of them serve as Officers for less Pay than our Corporals and Serjeants have. For 150,000 *French* Troops are maintain'd with less Money than fifty thousand *British*, which is maintaining three Men at the Expence of our one, besides the Expence of five Pound a Man, Levy Money, paid to the Officers of every Regiment. Therefore from the strictest Review, and by all the rules of Reason, the Augmenting the Army by additional Men to a Company, and

and additional Companies to a Regiment, is by far the most useful : That it is by far the least expensive, is demonstrable from this; that five thousand, seven hundred and five Men, when raised in Regiments, cost to the Public one hundred and sixteen thousand, three hundred and twenty two Pound fourteen Shillings and two Pence; whereas 5780 Men raised by additional Men to Companies with a second Lieutenant to each Company amounts to only eighty six thousand, nine hundred and ninety two Pounds, fifteen Shillings. Therefore the difference betwixt the two Methods of Augmentations stands as follows.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
By Regiments —	116,322	: 14	: 2
By additional Men	86,992	: 15	: 0
with a second Lieutenant to each Company			

Thus, besides the Forces raised by additional Men being more serviceable, there is an immediate saving to the Nation of

29,329 : 19 : 2

This

This, supposing we
 had augmented 11410
 of our lately raised and
 intended Troops in } 59,759 : 18 : 4
 this manner amounts
 to ———— }

Add to this the fu-
 ture saving to the Na-
 tion of Officers which
 are raised for the new
 Corps, when they } 141,876 : 00 : 0
 come upon Half-pay,
 which will amount to
 20,260 *l.* and in seven
 Years to ———— }

Thus the total saving is 201,735 : 18 : 4

As I have already said, that supposing
 the additional Troops had been raised in
 the frugal manner, they must have been
 equally, if not more serviceable to the
 Nation than those raised in Regiments,
 I think myself obliged to acquaint you
 that this is not only confirmed by the
 Practice of the *German* Princes and other
 military Powers, many of whom have
 twelve, fourteen, sixteen hundred Men
 commonly in a Regiment, but likewise
 F by

by the Opinion of the greatest and the oldest General in *Great Britain*.

But should we admit, what a great number of understanding Persons will dispute, that the Military Force of this Nation is insufficient towards enslaving it by open Force; yet the Method of Augmentation by new Corps, may be attended with Consequences fatal in time to the Constitution, by encreasing the Number of Commissions in the Army, which may be disposed of in such a manner, as to answer any Intention of enslaving the Nation by Parliamentary Authority. And indeed when one considers in what manner the Commissions and great Posts in the Army have gone for some time past, there is the strongest Reason to believe that Par——ry Considerations have been the greatest Motive both of Favour and Disgrace. The Expedition to the *West Indies*, an Expedition on the Success of which depends not only the Event of this War, but in a great measure the Honour and Interest of this Nation, is carried on by Regiments new levied, raw, and undisciplined. Whereas by all the Rules of true Policy, the Execution of it should have been entrusted only with the
best

best and oldest Regiments in the Service. But in the old Regiments, all the Favou-rites of the M——r have Commissions, and *America* is too distant a Scene of Action for them to be of Service either in the House, or in the Elections. Therefore we find such Regiments have been pitched upon as containing not a single Man of Parliamentary Consideration, but one, and he happened to vote against the Convention. This is so bold and bare-fac'd a Demonstration of the M——'s Intentions to make the Success of the present War subservient to his own private partial Views at home, that I may defy the most abandoned of his Creatures to account for it; especially if we consider that were he now to pick the same Number of Regiments out of all the Service, he could not find a Number so void of Members of P——t, as those who have been sent to *America*.

This is still the more provoking, as not only the Fortune of the War abroad may be affected by such a Conduct, but the Debts of the Nation at home must be encreased. The War has already cost the Nation an immense Sum, and this Sum is likely to encrease by the Success of it being
 now

now rendered doubtful; had the Augmentation taken place, by additional Men to each Company, and not by new Corps, the Nation might have, as we have seen, been a good Sum in Pocket towards defraying the necessary *Expences* of the War. But there is a Consequence still worse attending such a Method of Augmentation as has been fallen upon, and that is, that the three hundred seventy Officers which our Augmentation, as it is to be managed, creates, occasions at least one thousand new Commissions, by which the M——r has it in his Power to oblige the Persons, Relations and Friends of as many Gentlemen who may be useful to him in a Parliamentary Capacity. This, upon the Eve of a new Election, carries with it the very worst Aspect; and such an Addition of Influence as this must create, may give a decisive and incurable Wound to the Constitution. We may likewise remember, that towards the Beginning of this Parliament there was an Augmentation of eight thousand forty Men, by bringing over eight Regiments from *Ireland*, and by the Additions of Men to the *British* Corps. Tho' this Augmentation was made under a Pretence of being in readiness

ness to assist the House of *Austria*, yet we tamely stood by and saw that House reduced, without our suffering one of these Regiments to stir a foot in its Service. Yet at that time we were under as strong Engagements to assist that House, as we are now.

I shall add to all the Considerations which I have submitted to you, one more, and that I take to be a strong Proof that the H——le Gentleman, who is supposed to have the Direction and Disposal of every thing, never reflects how useful an Officer may be in the Field, but how complying he is in the House; as a Proof of this we see at this time, that of all our four oldest Generals, there is not one of them employed by the Government. Is this owing to their wanting Experience and Abilities? That I believe never was pretended by even the most profligate of the M——l Tools. Is it owing to their being excelled by those who are in Service? That, I believe, is as little pretended. Then, Sir, to what can it be owing, but to the Reason I have assigned?

The next Aggravation I shall take notice of is, “ A Supposition that a Minister has undone the Nation in her
“ Trade,

“ Trade, in her Manufactures, in her Re-
 “ putation and Interest abroad. That
 “ this he has done by meanly putting up
 “ with the most infamous Usage; and
 “ when he could not continue Peace even
 “ at the Expence of submitting to that
 “ Usage, that he has been driven into a
 “ War which has been carried on in a
 “ scandalous, pusillanimous Manner”

If you, Sir, are of Opinion that the
 Nation, since this Gentleman came into
 the supreme Direction of Affairs, has in-
 creased and flourished, in all the Particu-
 lars I have mention'd; you was in the
 right not to v—e against him in the
 Motion so often mention'd; but at the
 same Time you condemn the repeated
 Instances of Disapprobation, which you
 have given ever since you came into Par-
 liament, by voting against him in every
 Question, when any of these Particulars
 were concern'd. But, to speak seriously,
 I should be glad to know, if you think
 there is a Man in the Nation, who has
 lived twenty Years, who does not perceive
 that her Trade is upon the Decline. I
 have often heard you yourself, Sir, reflect
 what a fatal Blow it got by the wanton
 Embargoes that were clapt upon our
 Vef-

Vessels in the beginning of this War. And when it was just beginning to recover from that Blow, our Coasts not being protected, almost ruined it. I believe Nobody has forgot in what a scandalous manner the Enemy was suffered to insult our Coasts, while we had upwards of 130 Ships in Commission, yet not one of them near to protect our Navigation. Have these Facts ever been deny'd? Or has ever any body been brought to Tryal upon them, tho' hundreds could be brought to prove their Notoriety? Has it ever yet been enquired into why the Nation was put to such vast Expences upon great Ships no way proper to protect the Trade, and the building of Twenty-gun Ships entirely neglected, tho' most proper to put a Stop to the Enemy's Pyratrical Conquests.

As to the Manufactures of our Nation I think it is past all Dispute, and has not only been neglected and discouraged during this H——— G———n's Administration; but with so much political Caution did he act, that there is the strongest Reason to believe that he stood so much in Awe of a neighbouring Power, as not to dare to prevent the Exportation of Wool,

Wool, which alone would have restored that most valuable Branch of our Manufactures to a flourishing State. This unaccountable Neglect is the more gross, in that the Consequences of in the least winking at such an Encroachment on the Property of the Nation, are to the meanest Capacity visibly ruinous. But even after the Practices of our Officers, who were stationed to prevent this destructive Intercourse with *France*, were discover'd, and proved to the Satisfaction of a Court of Justice, instead of making the proper Use of such a Discovery, by tracing it to the Fountain-head, and fixing it on the great Offenders, even the petty-convicted Offenders were suffer'd to escape, at least so mild was the Censure inflicted on them that they scarce felt it.

As to the Reputation, Sir, which this Nation has maintain'd, it would lead me into a longer Detail than at present I am inclined to make, should I attempt to prove, that she has suffer'd Insults, which the meanest State in *Europe* would not put up with. That she has by Turns courted and been affronted by every Power in *Europe*; and that now, when it was come to the Push, she stands alone, without

out an Ally to befriend her. The House of *Austria*, her most natural Friend, she suffer'd to be reduced, and *France*, her hereditary Enemy, to rise upon its Ruins. The *Dutch*, who always acted in concert with us, seem now averse to enter into any Measures for our Interest; and we have suffer'd the *French* to gain in the *North* such an Ascendant, that it will prove next to impracticable for us to preserve even the small Remains of our Trade in these Parts. The Interest of a Trading Nation is so inseparably linked with her Reputation, that whatever affects the one must affect the other likewise. But how her Foreign Interests have been car'd for, during the A——n of the R——t H——— G———n, let the numerous inconsistent Train of Treaties, Conventions, Engagements, and Preliminaries enter'd into within these twenty Years past witness. To go no farther back than the Treaty of *Sevil*, when we were so weak as to make express Provision, and to stipulate immediate Relief for all the Grievances of *Spain*, while we were contented with a precarious and eventual Redress of our own, which we never yet obtain'd. Did not we introduce

G

Don

Don Carlos into *Italy*, at a Time when the Wrongs of this Nation called aloud for the Punishment of his Family and Nation? Did we not fulfil, in the most punctual Manner, every Stipulation in favour of *Spain*, while all the poor precarious Terms, made for ourselves, were frustrated and postpon'd?

The Convention was the next notable Proof of our M——r's Address and Honesty. And here, Sir, give me leave to mention a Fact, which of itself is a P——y Motive for fixing a Censure, and that too of the severest kind: Both Houses, the House of Commons on the 30th of *March*, and the House of Peers on the 9th of *May* 1738, came to express Resolutions, That the Freedom of Navigation upon the *American*, and all other Seas, was the clear and undoubted Right of all the Subjects of *Great-Britain*. This Proposition was laid down in the Address of the House of Peers, in the following strong Terms, viz. "Resolv'd, That the Subjects of the Crown of *Great-Britain* have a clear and undoubted Right to navigate in the *American* Seas, to and from any Part of his Majesty's Dominions, and for carrying on such Trade and Commerce

as they are justly entitled to in *America*; and also to carry all Sorts of Goods and Merchandizes, or Effects, from one Part of his Majesty's Dominions, to any other Part thereof; and that no Goods so carried, are by any Treaty subsisting between the Crowns of *Great-Britain* and *Spain*, to be deem'd or taken as contraband or prohibited Goods; and that the searching of such Ships, on the open Seas, under pretence of their carrying contraband or prohibited Goods, is a Violation and Infraction of the Treaties subsisting between the two Crowns."

Here, Sir, we see a Right declar'd to be clear and undoubted, by an unanimous House of Parliament; but we find afterwards, that the same Right was render'd dark and doubtful, if not wholly given up, by the Convention. By this it was stipulated, that a Discussion of these Rights shall be submitted to the Discussion of four Plenipotentiaries: This, Sir, was a direct and an arbitrary Violation of the Resolutions of both Houses of Parliament, since these Resolutions ought to have been the Ground-work on which they ought to have gone; and the *sine qua non* of all the future Negotiations between Us and

Spain. That this was a culpable Disregard of Parliamentary Authority is evident, not only from the Fact itself, but from the Consequences of it; since it gave *Spain* a Handle for insisting upon the Terms of the Convention, and thereby render'd our Right of Navigation on the *American* Seas, by our own Concessions, precarious, or at least doubtful.

There is another Fact appearing upon the Face of the same Convention, which, in former Reigns, would have serv'd not only for a Foundation to the Censure of removing a Minister from his Majesty's Presence, but of impeaching him; the Affair I mean is that of *Georgia*. Here a Property, which had been ascertained to the Proprietors by Parliamentary Faith, was subjected to a future Discussion; nay, the Proprietors were depriv'd of the Means of defending themselves in case of an Attack, while the Convention was in dependence. Add to these, and many other Considerations, the Unwillingness the A——n has always discover'd towards laying any of the Papers, relating to that infamous Transaction, before the Parliament; a Proof that Discoveries of another nature would be the necessary Consequence of
of

of the Communication of the Papers call'd for on that Occasion. There is likewise the strongest Reason to believe (it having been asserted publicly thro' all the Courts of *Europe*, and never openly contradicted by us) that our Demand to a free Navigation, in the *American* Seas, was never so much as mentioned, by our Ministers, before the Conferences opened in consequence of the Convention; and that it never was made in form till *July* 1739, at which Time the Convention was actually broke, on the Part of the Spaniards, by the Non-payment of the 95,000 *l.* which ought to have been paid by the 24th of *May* preceding. Upon the Whole of this Negotiation, there is the strongest Reason to believe that the Convention, tho' not concluded at *Madrid* till *Jan.* 1739, was originally negotiated and transacted at *London* in *August* 1738, with Sir *Thomas Geraldino*; and, that the 68,000 *l.* which the *South-Sea* Company were to pay to the Crown of *Spain*, and which was, by that Crown, to be apply'd towards the Payment of our suffering Merchants, must have been entirely stifted, had not the *Spaniards* insisted on its being inserted in the Body of their Ratifications of the Convention,

vention, and intimated the Payment to the *South-Sea* Company, who rejected it. There is likewise the strongest Reason to believe, that the same Treaty was afterwards re-executed by the *British* Minister at *Madrid*, who was entrusted at the same Time to consent to an Act of the same import, tho' varied, only so as to conceal it. There is likewise the strongest Reason to believe, that this Sacrifice of the *South-Sea* Company was originally propos'd by an *English* to a *Spanish* Minister; and upon his accepting it, rejected in an Office-Letter by another *English* Minister, tho' afterwards brought into Execution. As all these Discoveries have either arisen from, or been confirmed by the Letters of Mr. K——ne, they must and ought to pass as prov'd, 'till the Ministry shall think fit to disprove them, by producing all the Instructions given to those who are charg'd with the Affairs of the Nation, in *Spain*; a Tryal, which they have ever shew'd the greatest Aversion to.

The Management of the present War I have hitherto omitted to speak to; but should I enter into Particulars on that Head, it would swell this Letter to an inconvenient Length: I shall therefore reduce

duce what I have to say on that Head to a few plain Propositions, which I shall submit to your own Consideration, as they are Consequences plainly to be drawn from your own Conduct within Doors.

In the first Place then, I think it is very plain, that we have not made that Use of the Superiority, which we had at the Beginning of this War, which a Minister in earnest to have it gloriously finish'd, would have made. The Sums of Money, granted on different Heads for Sea-Service, for the last six or seven Years, seem either never to have been apply'd that way, or very improperly apply'd; there having been as much Money granted, during this time, upon the several Heads applicable to the repairing and rebuilding our Ships, as would have been sufficient to build the the whole Fleet of *Britain* from the Keels of the Ships, and have put them thoroughly equipp'd to Sea. It is likewise most notoriously true, that, notwithstanding these vast Sums, very great numbers of our Ships appear to be in the worst Condition for Sea Service, that ever they were known to be in the Memory of Man; and many of them scarcely fit for *Spithead* Expeditions; Ships of War having sail'd out of
the

the River, design'd, as it was pretended, for foreign Service, that have with Difficulty been able to swim into the Docks of *Portsmouth* or *Plymouth* for further Repair.

Notwithstanding the Probability, and almost Certainty, that if Admiral *Vernon* had been properly supplied with a Body of Land-Forces, and more Ships of War, he would have put an End to the War, so that it might have proved advantageous and glorious to the Nation; yet we find, that of all our numerous Army, not a Company was sent to his Assistance, nor a Ship, till it was too late. There is likewise the strongest Reasons for believing that he has often applied for Stores, and that the small Quantities which was sent to him were, in his Letters to the Government here, represented as fit only for a *Spithead* Expedition. This is such a Proof of the M——r's Inclination that the War should be carried on in a scandalous Manner, and that the Enemy should not be attacked in their most sensible Parts, that all the Friends he has may be defied to account for it.

But not only was this brave Admiral left destitute of the means of acting offensively against the Enemy, but even of
being

being in a Condition to defend himself. The Enemy's Fleets were suffered to sail out of *Cadiz* as soon as the Season of the Year made it practicable for them to keep to Sea, by the sudden with-drawing of our Squadron from the *Mediterranean*. While it was impracticable thro' the Season that they should sail, our Fleet block'd them up; but as soon as that Difficulty was removed, they were suffered to depart. The Departure of the *Ferol*, the *Brest*, and the *Toulon* Squadrons for *America*, at a time when we might have prevented them all from sailing, is another shrewd Presumption, that nothing could give the M——r greater Pleasure, than to hear of Admiral *Vernon's* Miscarriage in the *American* Seas.

The Inaction of Admiral *Haddock* with a brave Fleet under his Command in the *Mediterranean*, is another just Foundation, if not for a Censure, yet for an Enquiry that may produce a Censure. No Body who is acquainted with that Admiral's Character, as a Sea-Officer, will dispute his Courage, or Readiness to execute the most vigorous Measures. Therefore his Inaction must fall as a heavy Charge upon those whose Duty it was to have given

H

him

him such Orders. Under this Head we may take notice of another important Circumstance of our Dishonour, in suffering the *Spaniards* quietly to possess themselves of the Land belonging to our important Fortrefs of *Gibraltar*, which, till the last Siege, we had still been in Possession of since the Peace of *Utrecht*. By this Permission, and Negligence on our Part, Fortifications have been erected, and Batteries raised upon that Ground by the *Spaniards*, whereby the Use of the advantageous Bay of *Gibraltar* is lost to *England*, and our Ships ever since forced to anchor both inconveniently and dangerously under the Walls of the Town. But what renders this the more flagrant and unaccountable is, that we had, at the very time when the *Spaniards* thus unjustly broke the Treaties, a *British* Admiral at *Cadix*, with a powerful Squadron of Ships of the Line, and quietly, and undisturbed left them in Possession of that Ground, and conveyed their Troops to take Possession of the *Tuscan* Dominions.

The next Notorious Act which I shall mention as a proper Foundation for an Impeachment, is an Act that appears every Day upon the Face of every Day's
Bills

Bills of Entry; and that is, that the M——r has publickly connived for many Years at the Trade carried on with this Nation from the Port of *Dunkirk*; by which means the ninth Article of the Treaty of *Utrecht* has been directly violated. A Charge of this Nature is of the worst Consequence, in that the Treaty of *Utrecht* is generally reckoned to be extremely disadvantageous to *Great Britain*; and therefore there is the greater Reason why those Stipulations that are in our favour, ought to be more zealously observed. In the next Place, the M——r himself was distinguished by his eager Prosecution of those who made the Treaty of *Utrecht*, for having favoured *France* in most of its Articles; therefore, from a Parity of Reason, if it was so dishonourable and disadvantageous to the Nation, that such a Treaty should be made, what may we imagine is due to those who have given up the little Advantages which the Nation received from that Treaty?

The next Aggravation which I mentioned, was a M——r's converting great Part of his Majesty's Treasure to his own Use; and when not a Shilling of it was

expended, or could be expended, but by his Direction, and in what manner he was pleased to appoint.

How far this Aggravation, Sir, may hold good in the present Case, is not very *hard*, but perhaps very *dangerous* to say. One thing we may venture to affirm, that since his entering upon the A———n, he has spent upon one Article of Luxury, more Money than he could claim as the accumulated Sum of the lawful Perquisites, and Sallary of all the visible Posts and Places he has enjoy'd under the Crown for these twenty Years past; which does not, in the Whole, amount to an Hundred Thousand Pounds. This, however, is but a trifling Consideration, when compared with the other gross Profusion of the Publick Money, upon Jobbs and Votes. This must plainly appear to every impartial Person who reflects, that for these twenty Years past, this Kingdom has paid the largest Taxes that ever were impos'd upon it in Time of Peace; and yet, that the publick Debts remain much as they stood at the Time when this Gentleman first enter'd on the Management of the Treasury. But what is still more astonishing, is, that the Civil List, the largest that ever was
granted

granted to the Crown, is at this Time considerably in Debt.

Thus far, Sir, I have thought fit to bring Facts from what immediately affects the Interest of the Nation at home; as to those which affect her abroad, they cannot so well admit of a Proof; therefore I shall be content to put you in mind, that the Charge urg'd against the Negotiators of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, of having left *France* too powerful, and the House of *Austria* too low, can be with much greater justice urg'd in the present Case, when *France* is incontrollable and absolute in *Europe*, and the House of *Austria* almost ruin'd.

I ask Pardon for taking up so much of your Time; but the Trouble is owing to yourself. I hope the Facts I have brought are not only a sufficient Justification of those Gentlemen, who chose to observe a Conduct different from yours in that important Question, but may be an Inducement to you to alter your Conduct, should a Motion, of a more strict and determin'd Nature, come afterwards under your Consideration.

I am, Sir, Yours, &c.

F I N I S.

granted to the Crown, is at this Time con-
siderably in Debt.
Thus far, Sir, I have thought fit to bring
Tells from what immediately affects the
Interest of the Nation as home; as to
those which affect her abroad, they cannot
so well admit of a Proof; therefore I shall
be content to put you in mind, that the
Charge urged against the Negotiators of
the Treaty of Utrecht, of having let
France too powerful, and the House of
Austria too low, can be with much greater
justice urged in the present Case, when
France is uncontrollable and absolute in Ita-
ly, and the House of Austria almost
ruined.

I ask Pardon for taking up so much of
your Time; but this is owing to
yourself. I hope I have brought
are not only a justification of
those Gentlemen, who chose to observe a
Conduct different from yours in that im-
portant Question, but may be an Induce-
ment to you to alter your Conduct, should
a Motion, of a more strict and determined
Nature, come afterwards under your Con-
sideration.

Yours, Sir, I am, &c.

F I N I S

